

dress this issue. Third, socio-economic capitalist precarities have eroded traditional masculine identities, fuelling reactionary, anti-feminist movements. Four, intersectional identities, namely gender and religion; and public occupations, such as journalism and politics, intensify women's exposure to digital violence and online misogyny.

The present paper underscores the significance of interpreting the domains of civil society in our daily lives, namely cyberspace, through a feminist security lens. This standpoint endeavours to deconstruct misogynistic narratives of male domination and seeks to establish regulatory solutions that prioritise women's safety and well-being.

AI AND THE FUTURE OF LEGAL EDUCATION

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ABSTRACT: Artificial Intelligence no longer lingers at the margins of legal education; it has become one of its central challenges. This paper explores how generative models, such as ChatGPT, disrupt not only pedagogy, but also the ethics, governance, and constitutional role of legal training. The argument advanced is simple: AI is neither the end of legal education nor a passing trend, but an opportunity for its renewal. The task ahead is to form jurists who can think with, against, and beyond technology.

KEY-WORDS: Legal education; Artificial Intelligence; Governance; Pedagogy; Ethics.

Let us begin with a provocation: who among you has not yet relied on Generative Artificial Intelligence (GenAI), such as ChatGPT, during your legal education or professional practice? Two assumptions may be ventured with confidence: first, you did not phy-

sically raise your hand just now, since academic writing rarely demands performative gestures; second, despite any instinct to deny it, you almost certainly have turned to ChatGPT for precisely such purposes.

Artificial Intelligence (AI) has

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long moved from the periphery of legal education to its very core. From the early experiments in expert systems in the 1980s to today's large language models (LLMs), the field has oscillated between enthusiasm for efficiency and fear of disintegration of professional judgement. The acceleration provoked by GenAI in the past three years makes the debate unavoidable: if law schools do not adapt, they risk irrelevance. Yet the challenge is not merely technological, it concerns pedagogy, ethics, regulation, governance, compliance, and ultimately the self-understanding of law as a field. The guiding thesis of this paper is that the future of legal education depends not on resisting AI, but on critically integrating it, preparing students to be both competent users and reflective jurists capable of interrogating its implications.

The history of AI in law runs deeper than many assume. In the late 1980s, EDWINA RISSLAND identified law as a promising domain for AI research, given its reliance on precedent, structured reasoning, and rich documentary record. Yet, she also warned of its peculiarities: law's open-textured concepts, conflicting rules,

and interpretive demands resist reduction to deductive algorithms¹⁵⁷. Early expert systems attempted to clone legal expertise by encoding rules and reasoning patterns into computer programs; while these projects revealed the difficulty of capturing legal nuance, they paved the way for more advanced systems in analytics, prediction, and reasoning¹⁵⁸. As machine learning matured, the focus shifted: instead of encoding rules, AI systems learned patterns from large corpora of text.

Today's GenAI represents a paradigm shift: rather than rigidly encoding knowledge, it produces contextually relevant text, arguments, and explanations, simulating aspects of legal reasoning – KURAKU, KALLA and colleagues describe ChatGPT as a revolutionary technology precisely because of its ability to generate natural, scalable, and contextually

¹⁵⁷ RISSLAND, EDWINA L. (1998). *Artificial Intelligence and Legal Reasoning - A Discussion of the Field & Gardner's Book*. In AI Magazine, vol. 9, no. 3, p. 45.

¹⁵⁸ LEITH, PHILIP (2010). *The Rise And Fall Of The Legal Expert System*. In European Journal Of Law And Technology, vol. 1, no. 1, pp. 1-3.

coherent responses¹⁵⁹. As developed by the authors, the advantages are undeniable (adaptability, scalability, and efficiency), but so are the limitations (bias inherited from data training, lack of emotional intelligence, and superficiality when dealing with highly specialized fields). In this sense, today's AI reprises the old dilemma of expert systems – law resists mechanical formalization – though on a new scale and with new stakes.

AI is not confined to classrooms. For practicing lawyers, these technologies have already begun to shift the terrain. ALARIE, NIBLETT and YOON argued as early as 2017 that tasks once considered the preserve of expert judgment – predicting case outcomes, generating briefs, or conducting discovery – can now be performed more efficiently by data driven tools¹⁶⁰. The result is

¹⁵⁹ AA. VV. (2023). *Study and Analysis of Chat GPT and its Impact on Different Fields of Study*. In International Journal of Innovative Science and Research Technology, vol. 8, is. 3, p. 827.

¹⁶⁰ ALARIE, BENJAMIN; NIBLETT, ANTHONY; YOON, ALBERT H. (2018). *How Artificial Intelligence Will Affect the Practice of Law*. In University of Toronto Law Journal, vol. 68, sup. 1.

not only greater transparency and efficiency but also profound disruption of the traditional law firm model, historically dependent on interns, hierarchical partner-associate structure, and billable hours, since clients are increasingly cost-sensitive, demanding precision and value.

As highlighted by the Center on the Legal Profession at Harvard Law School, clients are increasingly turning to Alternative Legal Services Providers and specialized startups, whose agility and technological integration position them at the center of the legal services market, thereby challenging the dominance of traditional law firms¹⁶¹.

As further developed by SUNDQUIST, technology is not merely a tool but a force reconstructing the very meaning of law¹⁶². From on

¹⁶¹ WILKINS, DAVID B.; FERRER, MARÍA J. ESTEBAN (2019). *Taking the "Alternative" Out of Alternative Legal Services Providers*. In The Practice, Harvard Law School Center on the Legal Profession, July/August.

¹⁶² SUNDQUIST, CHRISTIAN POWELL (2021). *Technology and the (Re)Construction of Law*. In Journal of Legal Education, vol. 70, nos. 2 & 3, pp. 402-405.

line dispute resolution platforms to algorithmic decision-making in government, law is increasingly mediated by digital infrastructures. The COVID-19 pandemic merely accelerated this shift, normalizing remote hearings and hybrid procedures. If legal practice itself is being reconstructed, legal education cannot stand still.

Most certainly direct evidence of AI's impact on learning comes from THIBAULT SCHREPEL's two-year classroom experiment. Students were divided into three groups: those prohibited from using ChatGPT, those permitted unrestricted use, and those trained in structured prompting and critical evaluation. The results are telling that memorization was unaffected, but reasoning and writing improved significantly when AI was used under guidance. The conclusion is unequivocal: prohibition is counterproductive, and structured integration is essential¹⁶³. This aligns with wider calls for reform: CONWAY emphasizes adaptability and inclusivity as core principles of le-

gal curricula, while SUNDQUIST insists that law schools must prepare students for a techno-legal landscape where digital fluency is inseparable from professional competence¹⁶⁴. The very format of traditional assessments – particularly long-form dissertations – may require rethinking in an age where drafting can be partially outsourced to machines.

Law schools should embrace pedagogical pluralism, allowing both students and professors to experiment with integration strategies. Students are not waiting for permission, since GenAI has become a tool of everyday intellectual life. By mid-2025, ChatGPT had over 700 million weekly active users, with writing, information-seeking, and practical guidance dominating the exchanges¹⁶⁵. For legal education, this highlights the inevitability of AI as a writing and decision supporter – precisely the domain

in which lawyers operate. Rather than resisting, institutions must teach law students to critically edit, contextualize and validate AI outputs – investment in AI literacy is important not only because we recognize AI's strengths, but also because we recognize its weaknesses.

Oxford University's 2025 decision to provide ChatGPT Edu to all students and staff is emblematic and illustrates how leading institutions are embracing AI. With enterprise-level data protection and privacy control, structured training, and governance frameworks, Oxford becomes the first United Kingdom (UK) university to operationalize the very pedagogical and ethical principles identified by empirical studies: structured exposure, AI literacy, and accountable integration. This model provides a blueprint for law schools worldwide¹⁶⁶.

Pedagogy cannot be separated from law's normative frameworks, since AI systems raise

profound constitutional and regulatory issues. Scholar SOLOW-NIEDERMAN warns of doctrinal collapse at the intersection of copyright and privacy, creating regulatory vacuums that risk entrenching corporate dominance¹⁶⁷. COBB and colleagues propose reviewability as a principle borrowed from administrative law to guide algorithmic accountability, ensuring that decisions remain subject to meaningful scrutiny¹⁶⁸. The European Union's (EU's) AI Act offers a rights-based framework, embedding human oversight and risk classification into regulatory design.

These debates belong inside the law school. To teach AI in law is not only to train competent users, but to cultivate critical jurists who can interrogate the ethi-

¹⁶³ SCHREPEL, THIBAULT (2025). *Generative AI in Legal Education: A Two-Year Experiment with ChatGPT*, available at SSRN

¹⁶⁴ CONWAY, DANIELLE M. (2021). *Embracing and Making Change in Legal Education: Serving the Law Students of Today and Tomorrow*. In *Journal of Legal Education*, vol. 70, nos. 2 & 3, pp. 402-405.

¹⁶⁵ AA. VV. (2025). *How People Use ChatGPT*. NBER Working Paper, no. 34255, pp. 1-4.

¹⁶⁶ OXFORD UNIVERSITY (2025). *Oxford Becomes First UK University to Offer ChatGPT Edu to All Staff and Students*. In *Oxford University News*, September 19.

¹⁶⁷ SOLOW-NIEDERMAN, ALICIA (2025). *AI and Doctrinal Collapse*. In *78 Stanford Law Review* (forthcoming 2026), Public Law Research Paper no. 2025-46, pp. 3-7.

¹⁶⁸ COBB, JENNIFER; LEE, MICHELLE, SENG AH; SINGH, JATINDER (2021). *Reviewable Automated Decision-Making: A Framework for Accountable Algorithmic Systems*. In *ACM Conference on Fairness, Accountability, and Transparency*, pp. 1-7.

cal, constitutional, and societal implications of AI systems. Here digital constitutionalism becomes particularly relevant: Scholars reminds us that AI is not only a technical question but a constitutional one, touching fundamental rights and democratic governance¹⁶⁹. Law schools, therefore, must not only teach students how to use AI, but also how to critique, regulate, and govern it in a responsible way.

Legal education thus faces a dual challenge: integration and governance. Integration requires embedding AI in research, writing, and reasoning, while governance demands ethical safeguards, transparency, and institutional accountability. The risk is clear: overregulating may stifle innovation and drive students into clandestine, unregulated use; underregulating may produce jurists and lawyers who cannot distinguish between valid reasoning and persuasive nonsense. The challenge lies in striking a ca-

reful balance: law schools must train graduates to act not only as competent users of AI but also as critical editors, strategic thinkers, and stewards of legal processes increasingly mediated by technology.

From RISSLAND's early reflections on the limits of legal formalization, to SCHREPEL's empirical evidence of AI's pedagogical potential, from ALARIE's vision of predictive analytics in practice to Oxford's institutional embrace of ChatGPT, the literature converges on a common insight: AI is not the end of legal education, but its renewal, its opportunity to reshape itself. Law schools must embrace this opportunity, preparing students to be fluent in law, literate in AI, and capable of navigating the uncertain terrain between them. The lawyer of tomorrow will not be replaced by AI but most certainly will not remain unchanged by it.

A VIABILIDADE LEGAL DA UTILIZAÇÃO DE SMART CONTRACTS NOS CONTRATOS PÚBLICOS E/OU ADMINISTRATIVOS EM PORTUGAL

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SUMÁRIO: 1. Introdução. 2. Pressupostos a observar para efeitos de atribuição de valor legal a um *smart contract* (de acordo com as especificidades da contratação pública e/ou da Administração Pública). 3. Admissibilidade da previsão do uso de *smart contracts* nas peças do procedimento; alguns aspectos sobre a formação de contratos, em especial públicos e/ou administrativos, numa blockchain. 4. Admissibilidade legal da celebração do contrato em forma de *smart contract*. 5. Consentaneidade da tecnologia sob análise com o instituto das modificações contratuais, mormente no contexto dos contratos administrativos. 6. Conclusão.

TABLE OF CONTENTS: 1. Introduction. 2. Assumptions to be observed for the purposes of assigning legal value to a *smart contract* (in accordance with the specificities of public procurement and/or public administration). 3. Admissibility of the use of *smart contracts* in procedural documents; some aspects of contract formation, particularly public and/or administrative contracts, on a blockchain. 4. Legal admissibility of entering into a contract in the form of a *smart contract*. 5. Compatibility of the technology under analysis with the institution of contractual modifications, particularly in the context of administrative contracts. 6. Conclusion.

RESUMO: Este artigo analisa a viabilidade legal da utilização de *smart contracts* – contratos digitais autoexecutáveis baseados em tecnologia

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¹⁶⁹ DUARTE, FRANCISCO DE ABREU (2025). *Digital Constitutionalism and Online Content Moderation: Three Models for the Future of Online Speech*. In Giovanni De Gregorio, Oreste Pollicino, and Peggy Valcke (eds), pp. 2-9.